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                                               NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
                                 
                 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
                     FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                                                
                                 
                          No.  01-2047 
                                                
                                 
                         PETER DEVITO, 
                                 
                                             Appellant 
                                 
                               v. 
                                 
                   BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE 
                         CITY OF NEWARK 
                                 
                                                
                                 
          Appeal from the United States District Court 
                 for the District of New Jersey 
              (D.C. Civil Action No. 99-cv-05558) 
           District Judge: Honorable John W. Bissell 
                                                
                                 
           Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
                        February 5, 2002 
                                 
          Before: SLOVITER, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges 
                    POLLAK*, District Judge 
                                 
                 (Opinion filed March 1, 2002) 
                                 
                                                
                                 
                            OPINION 
                                                
                                                
     *Honorable Louis H. Pollak, United States District Judge for the 
Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge: 
 
     On July 2, 1999, Peter DeVito ("DeVito") filed a complaint alleging 
racially and 
politically motivated discrimination by his employer, the Board of 
Education of the City 
of Newark (the "Board"), in violation of the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination 
("NJLAD"), 42 U.S.C.  1983, and the New Jersey and United States 
Constitutions.  In its 
March 26, 2001 judgment and order, the United States District Court for 
the District of 
New Jersey granted summary judgment in favor of the Board and dismissed 
DeVito's 
complaint with prejudice.  We now affirm. 
                               I. 
     The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  1331, 1343, 
and 1367.  We 
exercise appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1291, and the 
applicable standard 
of review is plenary.  Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 231-32 (3d 
Cir. 2001).  
Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material 
fact and the 
Board is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id.  We must view all 
facts and draw all 
reasonable inferences in DeVito's favor.  Id.  However, DeVito may not 
rely on the 
allegations in his pleadings; instead, through "more than a scintilla" of 
evidence, he must 
present "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."  
Id.; see Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56. 
 
 
                              II. 
     Because we write exclusively for the parties, a full recitation of 
the facts is 
unnecessary.  DeVito, a Caucasian male, alleges that the Board committed a 
series of 
discriminatory employment acts in violation of the NJLAD. 
     1.   In June 1990, the Board demoted him from the position of 
          Coordinator of Maintenance Services to electrician. 
      
     2.   In 1991, he applied for the position of Assistant Director of 
Repair 
          and Maintenance and was denied the job. 
      
     3.   In 1993-1994, he applied for, and was denied, the same position. 
     4.   In April 1995, the Board created the position of Director of 
Repair 
          and Maintenance and established hiring criteria that only one 
person 
          could fulfill.  
     5.   In January 1996, the Board created the positions of Acting 
Assistant 
          Director of Maintenance Services for Administration and Acting 
          Associate Director of Maintenance Services for Operations.  
          According to DeVito, the Board created these positions to 
promote 
          favored employees.  DeVito did not apply for either position. 
     6.   In March or April 1997, DeVito was reassigned from the 
electrical 
          shop to the field. 
     7.   In 1999, the Board posted the positions of Building Manager and 
          Engineer in Charge, although DeVito did not apply for either. 
     8.   In May 1999, DeVito was reassigned to the night shift.  Despite 
his 
          requests, the Board did not return him to the day shift. 
 
The District Court ruled that DeVito's NJLAD claim is time-barred with 
respect to the 
majority of these acts.  A two-year statute of limitations applies to an 
NJLAD claim in 
which the operative facts arose after July 27, 1993, while a six-year 
statute of limitations 
applies if the events occurred before this date.  Cardenas v. Massey, 269 
F.3d 251, 255 
(3d Cir. 2001) (citing Montells v. Haynes, 627 A.2d 654 (N.J. 1993)). 
     Although the District Court properly held that the claim survives to 
the extent it 
relies on acts Seven and Eight, it erred in holding that act Three 
satisfies the statute of 
limitations.  DeVito alleges that in 1993 he applied for, and was denied, 
the position of 
Assistant Director.  Nevertheless, the record reflects two specific dates 
that we could 
consider in determining the timeliness of the allegation.  On June 30, 
1993, Joseph 
Richardson resigned from this position.  See PA174.  At the same time, 
DeVito's 
deposition testimony suggests that Richardson's replacement, Vincent 
Lupiano, began 
serving as Assistant Director sometime between April and December 1994.  
See PA80; 
PA91.  DeVito claims that the Board discriminated against him by placing 
Lupiano in this 
position in violation of the applicable Eligibility List.  See PA158.   
     Regardless which time period is considered determinative, the statute 
of 
limitations would bar DeVito's claim based on this employment decision.  
If we consider 
June 30, 1993 as the date of the alleged discriminatory act, a six-year 
statute of 
limitations, expiring on June 30, 1999, would apply; in contrast, if we 
rely on the April to 
December 1994 time range, a two-year statute of limitations, expiring in 
1996, would 
apply.  Under either scenario, DeVito's NJLAD claim, filed July 2, 1999, 
would fail to 
satisfy the time bar to the extent it relies on the allegedly 
discriminatory hiring of 
Lupiano. 
     Despite this slight error, the District Court correctly held the 
"continuing violation" 
theory for equitable tolling inapplicable under the facts presented.  We 
apply three factors 
in determining whether a series of alleged discriminatory acts constitute 
a continuing 
violation: (1) whether the acts involve the same type of discrimination; 
(2) whether the 
acts are "recurring . . . or more in the nature of an isolated work 
assignment or 
employment decision;" and (3) whether each act has a "degree of permanence 
which 
should trigger an employee's awareness of and duty to assert his or her 
rights."  Rush v. 
Scott Specialty Gases, Inc., 113 F.3d 476, 480 (3d Cir. 1997).  In 
evaluating the third and 
most important factor, the District Court properly held that each alleged 
act of 
employment discrimination had a degree of permanence which, at the time of 
its 
occurrence, should have triggered DeVito's awareness of a possible 
violation of his rights.  
Id. at 483 ("Rush's failure to promote and train claim addresses discrete 
instances of 
alleged discrimination that are not susceptible to a continuing violation 
analysis.").  This 
holding is buttressed by the fact that these acts actually did trigger 
such awareness, as 
evidenced by DeVito's 1995 complaint that alleged a NJLAD claim based on 
the 
employment decisions involved in this case. 
                              III. 
     To the extent it relies on employment decisions that do satisfy the 
statute of 
limitations, DeVito's NJLAD claim cannot survive summary judgment.  
Establishing a 
discrimination claim under this statute involves the well-recognized 
burden shifting 
analysis established in  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 
(1973).  See 
Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 569 A.2d 793, 798 (N.J. 1990).  However, 
the 
prima facie stage is slightly modified in a reverse discrimination context 
where, as here, 
the plaintiff is part of a majority group.  Accordingly, DeVito must 
present "background 
circumstances" suggesting that the Board is "the unusual employer who 
discriminates 
against the majority."  Id. at 799. 
     The District Court held that DeVito failed to produce evidence of 
those 
"background circumstances," and we agree.  In support of his various 
allegations of 
discrimination, DeVito's only evidence is that the individuals who 
allegedly granted or 
received preferential employment treatment were African-American.  Without 
more, such 
evidence is insufficient.  See id. at 800 (pointing to the minority status 
of favored 
employees, without more, is insufficient evidence of "background 
circumstances"); see 
also Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 1999) ("[T]he race of 
the selecting 
officials is not a sufficient circumstance to establish a prima facie case 
of discrimination 
by itself."). 
                              IV. 
     DeVito's complaint also alleges that the Board engaged in political 
retaliation 
against him in violation of  1983.  The District Court properly rejected 
this claim as 
well.  The Board cannot be held vicariously liable under  1983.  Monell 
v. New York 
City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).  Instead, 
liability only arises if 
the Board adopted a policy, custom, or practice that resulted in DeVito's 
constitutional 
injury.  Id.; see Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1212 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(defining what 
action constitutes a policy or custom).  DeVito failed to produce any 
evidence 
establishing such a policy, custom, or practice, and thus, summary 
judgment in the 
Board's favor is appropriate. 
                          *  *  *  *  * 
     For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court's grant of 
summary 
 
judgment. 
                                                               
TO THE CLERK: 
     Please file the foregoing Opinion. 
                              By the Court, 
 
                              /s/ Thomas L. Ambro                                      
                                            Circuit Judge 
